TRAFFIC, TERRAIN AND WEATHER INFORMATION ARE DIFFERENT SENSORS
The navigation/warning architecture contains different systems for different hazards. Weather radar, ground-proximity/terrain warning and traffic collision avoidance do not share one universal detection method. A clear display in one channel does not establish the absence of the other hazards. The supplied navigation contents identify each as a distinct subsystem, and the EIS presentation distinguishes their associated indications. The operational chapter addresses how to respond; the systems task is to recognise what measurement or database relationship produced the information. [65] [60, ND/PFD indication and warning scope]
A traffic display supplies position/advisory information with its own target and data limitations. A traffic advisory and a resolution advisory are different stages, and the latter must be interpreted through the relevant indications and procedure. The current Fenix configuration register identifies an optional TCAS/autopilot function; an option’s existence is not authority to claim that every aircraft will make the same automatic manoeuvre. Establish the loaded option and supported implementation before using a coupled-response exercise. [87, PDF p. 177] [70, Available Options: fnx_tcas_ap_enabled]
Terrain/proximity warnings depend on the applicable equipment, sensor validity, configuration and, for database-based functions, the relevant stored information. They should not be confused with a barometric-altitude clearance check. Radio height, gear/flap state and other inputs can be important to the warning context. A terrain display also has a different purpose from weather returns. Do not treat a warning inhibit selected for one defined procedure as removal of the underlying hazard or as a general fix for an unfamiliar approach indication. [65, Sections1.34.40 and1.34.70; radio-altimeter/GPWS scope] [87, PDF pp. 171–181]
Simulator weather-radar and surveillance capability must be established from current platform/developer documentation and the actual scenario. A visible control, ND overlay label or decorative antenna is insufficient evidence of a complete operational sensor model. This manuscript does not invent a current V3 radar operating envelope or claim storm-detection capability from a historical Airbus description. The coverage matrix marks detailed current radar/terrain/surveillance implementation as requiring verification beyond the cited option/presentation evidence. That boundary is operationally meaningful because an absent simulated return cannot safely be interpreted as a clear path through weather. [65, Source effectivity; separate sensor descriptions] [86, Documented implemented-failure scope] [70, Available Options; hardware/presentation configuration scope]