A REJECTED TAKEOFF IS A DECISION WITH A STOPPING PLAN
The takeoff briefing must cover the point at which a problem becomes a stop decision and the point at which continuation is the safer planned response. The supplied FCTM divides the roll into low- and high-speed decision regimes, with a progressively stronger expectation of continuation as V1 approaches unless the specified serious conditions exist. Its particular thresholds and caution lists belong to that procedure and edition. Prepare the applicable current framework before the roll, while there is time to understand the stopping and flight-path consequences. A late warning is not an invitation to design that framework from scratch. [21, PDF pp. 215–217]
V1 must be connected to the accepted performance calculation and the timing of the stopping decision. The first stopping action must begin no later than V1, so the decision to reject must already have been made before reaching that speed. Beginning to consider the problem only at V1 spends distance that the preparation did not reserve as free time. Changes in mass, surface condition, starting point, brake condition or delay can erode the stopping margin. The result is a coupled problem of detection, decision, action and actual deceleration. A nominally long runway does not remove those assumptions or make a high-speed stop harmless. [21, PDF pp. 215–217] [126, PDF p. 21]
During the stop, maintain directional control and assess achieved deceleration. The DECEL indication, when available, reflects achieved deceleration relative to its criterion; it is not a complete test of whether autobrake is functioning. On a contaminated surface, antiskid activity can prevent the expected light even while the system is operating. Compare the speed trend, felt or observed slowing and runway remaining with the selected system and applicable response. The aircraft needs sufficient actual stopping performance. A selected MAX button alone cannot provide that evidence. [21, PDF p. 217]
Stopping transfers the problem into a different phase. Establish that the aircraft is stopped and secured, assess the initiating failure and fire/smoke situation, coordinate with cabin crew and ATC, and use the applicable procedure for any evacuation decision. An evacuation is not the automatic consequence of every rejected takeoff. Nor does a completed stop establish that the aircraft is ready to taxi away: brakes, tyres, engine state and the original failure may still determine the next action. Keep the stopping manoeuvre and the subsequent assessment distinct in practice. [21, PDF pp. 218–220]
For training, begin with a briefed failure at a selected, repeatable event using Fenix's documented failure controls. Decide the intended response and success criteria before triggering it. Review runway identity, calculated speeds, aircraft tracking and the first evidence of deceleration afterwards. Only later introduce uncertainty about the failure, while preserving a credible aircraft state and an available applicable procedure. The purpose is to improve decision timing and monitoring; producing an especially dramatic stop adds little if the initiating conditions cannot be reconstructed. [127, Manual failure arming and event triggers] [21, PDF pp. 215–220]